Philosophy Made Slightly Less Difficult by Garrett J. DeWeese & J. P. Moreland

Author:Garrett J. DeWeese & J. P. Moreland
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: Philosophy;philosopher;Christian philosophy;Christian philosopher;faith and philosophy;Christianity and philosophy;ethics;Christian ethics;Christianity and science;logic;metaphysics;epistemology;philosophy of science;philosophical anthropology;aesthetics;philosophy of religion;intro to philosophy;introduction to philosophy;philosophy introduction;philosophy explained;simple philosophy;what is philosophy
Publisher: InterVarsity Press
Published: 2021-01-04T12:30:56+00:00

THE SELF AND SUBSTANCE DUALISM

In this section we argue for substance dualism—namely, that the owner of consciousness (the soul or self) is immaterial. Substance dualists are also property dualists because substance dualists believe that both the ego and consciousness itself are immaterial. But one can be a mere property dualist without being a substance dualist if one accepts the immateriality of consciousness but holds that its owner is the body or, more likely, the brain. In contrast with mere property dualism, substance dualists hold that the brain is a physical thing which has physical properties and that the mind or soul is a mental substance which has mental properties. When I am in pain, my brain has certain physical properties (electrical, chemical), and my soul or self has certain mental properties (the conscious awareness of pain). The soul is the possessor of its experiences. It stands behind, over, and above them and remains the same throughout one’s life. The soul and the brain can interact with each other, but they are different particulars with different properties.

We offer three arguments for some form of substance dualism.

Our basic awareness of the self. When we enter most deeply into ourselves, we become aware of a very basic fact: we are aware of our own self (ego, I, center of consciousness) as being distinct from our bodies and from any particular mental experience we have, and as being an uncomposed, spatially unextended center of consciousness. I simply have a basic, direct awareness of the fact that I am not identical to my body or my mental events; rather, I am the immaterial self that has a body and a conscious mental life.

An experiment may help convince you of this. Right now I am looking at a chair in my office. As I walk toward the chair, I experience a series of chair representations. That is, I have several different chair experiences that replace one another in rapid succession. As I approach the chair, my chair sensations vary. If I pay attention, I am also aware of two more things. First, I do not simply experience a series of sensory images of a chair. Rather, through self-awareness, I also experience the fact that it is I myself who has each chair experience. Each chair sensation produced at each angle of perspective has a perceiver who is I. An I accompanies each sensory experience to produce a series of awarenesses: I am experiencing a chair sense image now.

I am also aware of the basic fact that the same self that is currently having a fairly large-chair experience (as my eyes come to within twelve inches of the chair) is the very same self as the one who had all the other chair experiences preceding this current one. Through self-awareness, I am aware of the fact that I am an enduring I who was and am (and will be) present as the owner of all the experiences in the series.

These two facts—I am the owner of my experiences, and I am an enduring self—show that I am not identical to my experiences.

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